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Abstract
It is from the mere announcement of the possibility of human cloning that moralists have for-
mulated critical arguments against the permissibility of introducing this practice. A critical
survey of these arguments, however, shows that they are not well founded, i.e. that frequently
they are not such that they can be used as legitimate arguments in the debate about what is
publicly permissible in a state, that they rely on mistaken premises, or that they are non cohe-
rent with permissions in relation to other forms of human reproduction.
Each argument in favor of the banning of human cloning is analyzed by at least one of these
means: whether it is coherent with the fundamental principles of contemporary democracies
(in particular, in relation to the right of every individual to pursue her system of value in her
life); whether it relies on well-founded and widely accepted results of scientific researches; and,
whether it is coherent with the usual and widely shared moral attitudes related to other forms
of human reproduction. The most important argument that is taken as a good foundation for
the prohibition of human cloning is the moral duty not to harm future persons.
The result of the rejection of traditional moral arguments against human cloning does not
represent an overall justification of human cloning: it only shows that new, or more sophisti-
cated, arguments must be found if human cloning is to be banned.
1. Introduction
The mere possibility of a hypothesis of human cloning has been the source
of a great number of concerns, worries and reactions. In general, the reac-
tions have been grounded on three sorts of arguments: the first states the
intrinsic immorality of cloning; the second claims that cloning is intrinsi-
cally a cause of harm to human beings (i.e. that it is not possible, or prob-
able, that a procedure of cloning is applied and that some damage is not
caused); the third says that cloning is not intrinsically, as such, a damaging
procedure, but it has nevertheless to be banned because the only possible,
or the most probable, motivations for it are morally unjustifiable.
A review of the traditional arguments shows that they are problematic
from the standpoint of political autonomy of the individual, a broadly
shared value in contemporary political philosophy, as well as in the legal
orders of contemporary states. The first sort of arguments tries to appeal
to some widely accepted moral beliefs. However, a critical analysis indi-
cates that these intuitions are not so unproblematic when taken without
qualifications. On the other hand, the appeal to qualifications causes fur-
ther troubles, because they need to rely on general metaphysical or relig-
ious doctrines. This is not compatible with the basic principles of contem-
porary democracy, which does not accept as a good crucial ground for pro-
hibitions of actions the appeal to basic conceptions linked to religions or
fundamental metaphysical questions, and, as such, heavily controversial.
The second sort of arguments is based on wrong inferences from the scien-
tific data, or on a discriminatory application of a moral rule to cloning. The
third sort of arguments are such that they do not consider enough possibili-
ties for human cloning that are related to morally acceptable motivations.
The requirement to forbid human cloning by the laws of public institutions,
therefore, has to be grounded on new basis in order to be convincing.
However, I have to admit some limits of the paper. First, it is limited to the
acceptance of the principle of autonomy, in coherence with proposals of
liberal political philosophy. The conclusions of the paper are, therefore,
conditional on this acceptance. Second, the argumentation is limited to
normative conclusions as relevant for the enforcement by law, and it does
not cover a general moral argumentation. Third, and consequently from
what I have already said, the paper is limited to consider some of the most
representative arguments valid in the debate about the legal enforcement
of the prohibition of cloning, and not the full range of arguments on cloning.
I will explain this limit later in the paper.1
2. Presuppositions of the debate
For the sake of the discussion, in this paper I presuppose something very
distant from reality, i.e. that human cloning is a safe procedure that en-
sures a high rate of successful results in its application. So, I presuppose
that we can fairly anticipate that there is not a high rate of mortality in
pregnancies resulting from human cloning, or a high probability of unex-
pected dysfunctions in the future human being. This presumption, although
very distant from reality, is necessary in order to focus on the specific prob-
lem on cloning, which requires to avoid a set of moral complications re-
lated to a more general discussion. I refer to the (at least prima facie)
moral duty not to put in danger the future of human beings. Such a moral
duty forbids (at least prima facie) in the same way the application of any
kind of physician assisted fertilization, or behavior of the pregnant woman,
or of activities linked to influences of the environment that are dangerous
for the quality of life of the person that is to be born. There is a sufficient
level of consensus that condemns (at least prima facie) such behaviors, and,
therefore, a discussion about this topic is not necessary in the specific con-
text of discussions about human cloning.2 There can surely appear prob-
lems also in relation to imaginary or real situations related to at least some
of the indicated cases that can be sources of moral dilemmas (for example,
we can find a dilemma about whether to make use of some of these prac-
tices for some very important needs for human beings), but this is also a
complication that I avoid in this paper. In brief, it is my opinion that hu-
man cloning for reproductive reasons must not be permitted until it be-
comes a safe procedure. I avoid to consider this problem in this paper in
order to discuss what may be the moral evaluation of human cloning for re-
productive reason in the case it becomes a safe procedure.
It is not part of my fictitious presupposition, however, the strong hypothe-
sis of genetic determinism, i.e. the idea that all of our physical and mental
features are determined by the genetic structure inherited by the individual
by the accomplishment of fertilization. The strong version of genetic deter-
minism is plausibly refuted in current discussions, and, therefore, there is
no point in taking it as a hypothesis in the current ethical debates on clon-
ing. I found particularly instructive the discussions of Philip Kitcher and
Renato Dulbecco.3
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I avoid considering a further complication related to human cloning at the
actual level of its development. I refer to the fact that it is still at an experi-
mental level, therefore its development includes experiments on human
embryos.4 However, in the same way as another problem indicated earlier,
it represents a more general problem than that of human cloning as such.
3. The Value of Autonomy
An assumption widely shared in contemporary societies is that of the value
of political autonomy of the individual, i.e. of the entitlement of each indi-
vidual to build her life according to her own system of value or good. As a
consequence, every limitation of one’s action that has a certain relevance
in this life plan has to rely on some reasons. The burden of proof is always
on the side of those requiring limitations of freedom. Because of this rea-
son, there are opinions that state that the real problem of the attitude to-
wards cloning is not that of permitting it too quickly, but, on the contrary,
that of forbidding it too quickly.5 I do not share this stance when stated
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seems to me that an interesting synthetic
way to show the question is that of the Nobel
Prize winer Renato Dulbecco: »Genes have
to be considered as the pilots of our life be-
cause they determine all of our features; but
they do not work on their own, because they
cooperate with the environment, e.g. with
what we eat and drink or the influence of
people around us. They act, therefore, like
the pilot of an airplane, who chooses the way
dependently on the weather conditions that
he finds.« – La mappa della vita. L’interpre-
tazione del codice genetico: una rivoluzione
scientifica al servizio dell’umanità, Sperling
and Kupfer, Milano 2001, p. 117. When
speaking about the mental features of sub-
jects, Dulbecco puts the things by the dis-
tinction between an old part of the brain
that is responsible for the genetically deter-
mined expressions of the individual, and the
more recent part of the brain (related to ra-
tionality) that is more suitable for adapta-
tion to new external situations, leaving in
this way a space for the influence of the envi-
ronment. See: R. Dulbecco, La mappa della
vita, pp. 117–139. When discussing about featu-
res like illnesses, there are situations where,
unfortunately, genetic determinism is strong
(like the Tay-Sachs and the Lesch-Nyhan),
while, on the other hand, there are illnesses
that manifest themselves in virtue of genetic
dysfunctions, but only if related to environ-
mental influence, like, for example, a damag-
ing feeding. See: R. Dulbecco, La mappa della
vita, pp. 172–174.
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Hans Jonas. See: H. Jonas, Tecnica, me-
dicina ed etica, Einaudi, Torino 1997 (Tech-
nik, Medizin und Ethik. Zur Praxis des Prin-
zips Verantwortung, Insel Verlag, Frankfurt
am Main 1985), pp. 136–148.
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Richard A. Epstein, »A Rush to Caution:
Cloning Human Beings«, in: M. Nussbaum,
C. Sunstein (eds.), Clones and Clones, pp.
262–279.
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without qualifications and refinements, but, coherently with Western po-
litical culture, I accept the value of political autonomy as basic.
It is part of the respect of political autonomy that public institutions must
not enforce a particular metaphysical, religious or other general controver-
sial vision. Every requirement of prohibition or obligation that has such a
kind of foundation cannot be legitimate in the context of the argumenta-
tive model of Western democracies, the political tradition to which we be-
long. In this statement, I rely heavily on the work of John Rawls, in particu-
lar on his idea of public reason as a model of argumentation in the public
domain.6 As Rawls says, public reason requires that in the process of justi-
fication in the public debate people appeal to beliefs generally accepted
and forms of reasoning found in common sense, as well as to conclusions
of science when they are not controversial. It appears clearly from this, that
we may not appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines
as crucial reasons when we require to public institutions to apply coercion.
In brief, Rawls says that
»… as far as possible, the knowledge and ways of reasoning that ground our affirming the
principles of justice and their application to constitutional essentials and basic justice are to
rest on the plain truths now widely accepted, or available, to citizens generally«.7
With this, I declare explicitly what the boundaries of my paper are. I discuss
arguments for the prohibition of cloning in the public domain. Obviously,
it is possible to consider deep premises and metaphysical presumptions or
implications of cloning. However, as I said, these are not valid crucial argu-
ments in the debates in public political institutions, at least as far as they
remain controversial and without a possibility of common solution, and we
want a society based on cooperation and not on oppression. Therefore, in
this paper, I concentrate on those arguments that can be used as valid pub-
lic reasons (reasons valid for public political institutions) because they ap-
peal to some presupposed common values, or follow common methods of
reasoning, or appeal to evidence that all full members of the political society
can ascertain.
There are, of course, several arguments that try to speak for the banning of
human cloning. Most generally, as I indicated at the beginning of the pa-
per, there are three kinds of arguments in this field. I indicate them now in
some more details. First, there are arguments that find reasons of intrinsic
immorality in the procedure. For example, there are people who say that
cloning represents a radical manipulation of the intrinsic relationality and
complementarity at the origin of human reproduction, both in its biological
as well as personalistic aspects. The fundamental relations between human
beings are radically altered (precisely, the relation between parents and
children). There is an attempt to reproduce what happens in nature, but
the price is that of ignoring what constitutes a human being beyond her
biological nature, and the reduction of her to the reproductive features of
less biologically developed beings.8
Second, there are arguments that find cloning by its intrinsic features as a
procedure that creates disadvantaged human beings. Human beings crea-
ted by cloning are disadvantaged independently of the motivation by which
they are created. Thus, for example, it is stated that cloning strengthens the
idea that some people can have total control of other people’s life by pro-
gramming their biological identity. Moreover, the dignity of the new per-
son, according to this view, is damaged because she is only a ‘copy’ of an-
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other being. The mental identity of the new person is threatened because
of the virtual or real presence of another her. The clone will be under the
pressure of the expectation that she reproduces the original individual.9
Hans Jonas says that cloning crashes against the right not to have know-
ledge about the future, as he says, a right to ignorance. Cloning crashes
against this right even if the strong thesis of genetic determinism is not
true. The mere fact that an individual, and her environment, believes that
the future is determined breaks the spontaneity in the creation of a human
life.10 The kinds of arguments to which I refer here are arguments that ap-
peal to the value of autonomy, and the autonomy that is relevant here is
the autonomy of the possible future person, i.e. the clone. A particular ob-
jection is that through cloning women are radically humiliated and reduced
to a mere technical reproductive function.11
The third line of argumentation does not see anything intrinsically wrong
in the practice of cloning, but it nevertheless indicates reasons to be suspi-
cious in relation to it. This sort of discussion asks questions about the pos-
sible motivations for cloning, and it remarks the difficulties in discovering
motivations that respect the rights of the future person. Such is the discus-
sion offered by Philip Kitcher.12 As he indicates, a person is never only the
result of her genetic inheritance, therefore, the attempt to realize with high
certainty an individual with the characteristics of an existing person is illu-
sory. For example, parents that are inspired by the beauty of an existing ac-
tress (let her be Monica Bellucci) can only reasonably hope that they will
improve the chances of their daughter to be an attractive woman, not that
they will ensure their daughter the privilege of being an attractive woman.
There is much more in the attractiveness of Monica Bellucci than her ge-
netic inheritance. The same we can say for other cases, let them be scien-
tists, sportspersons, etc. Kitcher indicates nevertheless something danger-
ous in the reasoning and plans of the potential parents, and this is included
in the statement »Cloning would surely have raised the probabilities of our
obtaining the child we wanted«. Kitcher comments this sentence:
»Just that final phrase indicates the moral squalor of the story. As I have imagined it, we have
a plan for the life to come laid down in advance; we are determined to do what we can to
make it come out a certain way – and, presumably, if it does not come out that way, it will
count as a failure. In the present scenario, there is a crass failure to recognize the child as an
independent being, one who should form his own sense of who he is and what his life means.
The contours of the life are imposed from without.«13
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The problem that Kitcher identifies, therefore, is related to the possible
goal of cloning, not to cloning as such. It is morally impermissible, because
it is continuous with other forms of disrespect of autonomy. The next ques-
tion asked by Kitcher is whether there might be possible goals for human
cloning that are morally acceptable. He indicates three hypothesis. One is
the case of parents who have a child in potential need of organs for trans-
plantation. They can decide to make a child by cloning in order to have
available organs. Second, there is the case of a widow who lost her husband
in a car accident. In the same accident her daughter was also severely dam-
aged, and is now facing an imminent death. The mother wishes to have a
child by cloning in order to get a continuity with this daughter. Third, we
have the case of a lesbian couple. They wish to apply cloning in order to
have children by their genetic material. According to Kitcher, the first two
cases are situations in which a clear disrespect for the future person is
shown, because she is obviously treated in an instrumental way. The third
case seems the most plausible, because it is inspired by the usual, legiti-
mate motivation when a couple has a child. However, even in this case,
Kitcher does not see a particular reason to make use of cloning instead of
the already available means of assisted procreation.
4.1. Arguments about the intrinsic immorality of cloning
As I indicated, the argument that appeals to the intrinsic immorality of hu-
man cloning has different manifestations. However, it is a shared ambition
of these arguments to indicate a common moral belief, a common value,
that grounds the prohibition of cloning. The situation is, however, more
complicated. Let’s see the statements in turn.
The first is that cloning represents a radical manipulation of the intrinsic
relationality and complementarity at the origin of human reproduction,
both in its biological as well as personalistic aspects, and that the funda-
mental relations between human beings are radically altered by cloning
(precisely, the relation between parents and children). The authors of this
criticism obviously presuppose that we evaluate with particular considera-
tion the relation established by two human beings in the process of repro-
duction and that we find the dignity of reproduction in this relation. The
same for family relations established by reproduction. However, the intui-
tion is not so clear, or, in any case, it is not clearly connected with other in-
tuitions largely accepted. The intrinsic relationality and complementarity at
the origin of human reproduction can be altered with procedures of as-
sisted procreation already known and frequently applied. There is surely a
lot to say in relation to the alteration of the complementarity and relation-
ality at the beginning of human reproduction if we consider the practice of
heteronymous assisted procreation, or of surrogate motherhood, for exam-
ple. In the first case, we may have a biological and legal mother and a legal
father, where the legal father has no biological relation with the child, and
a biological father who has no relation at all with the child, except biologi-
cally, which is, however, unknown to everybody. In the second case, we can
have a large amount of variations. In one possibility it can happen that the
legal mother has a genetic relation with the child, but she is not the gesta-
tional mother; in another case she has a genetic relation, but she is not the
gestational mother, and, moreover, the legal mother can have no biological
relation at all with the child (in the last case, her situation seems to me to-
tally equivalent to that of the father in the case of heteronymous assisted
450SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA E. Baccarini, The Liberal View on Some40 (2/2005) pp. (443–459) Issues in the Moral Debate about Cloning
procreation, except for the fact that in surrogate motherhood the gesta-
tional mother is known and, so, the case is more complicated). The first
moral consideration, therefore, is that cloning is not, from this standpoint,
such a big innovation.
Obviously, the critics may say that all these practices must be forbidden,
and some of the critics say this.14 The facts appealed by these critics is that
human reproduction has a particular natural order which has normative
power, and a particular natural kind of complementarity and relationality
which have normative power as well. However, in this case, the appeal is
not to a common moral intuition, but to a specific religious and a related
metaphysical viewpoint. The attempt to impose such a perspective clashes
with a commonly accepted principle, at least in the political orders of the
Western civilization, that the state should not enforce specific and contro-
versial moral visions of the world, in particular in relation to fundamental
moral questions. For example, no religion has to be privileged, nor any re-
ligion, or agnosticism, or atheism may be discriminated against.
We will understand much better how problematic the debate is if we con-
sider the fact that the actions of human beings frequently deny the norma-
tivity of nature. This happens whenever we treat a disease. It would fit with
natural order to permit nature to take its course in at least two meanings.
First, the most obvious, because of the fact that the disease is a natural
phenomenon, while the treatment is an artificial opposition to it. But, there
is a more theoretical level of the discussion, which relies on Darwinian
grounds. As Darwinism is concerned, the treatment of a disease, and the
attempt to save a subject affected by it, may be a case of intercourse with
the natural most basic principle in biology: the principle of natural selec-
tion. It appears from this that the argument of appeal to natural order and
its normativity is not so simple and it requires further discussion with a
connection to metaphysical and theoretical background. Obviously, only
some minority groups in society, and only in some cases, would accept the
radical statement of non interference with nature in case of a disease. The
question, now, becomes: where can we put the boundaries of our legiti-
mate interference with nature? We face here a demanding question, and I
am not going to discuss it in detail. It is enough, for the present purpose of
a public domain discussion, to indicate that the critics do not appeal to a
simple common intuition that may be taken by itself as sufficient to justify
a prohibition.
The argument for the banning of cloning can take a different form. In this
case, it says that what is damaged is not natural order as such, but the spe-
cific natural order of love and family relations between human beings. This
version of the argument does not seem to me to have a better prospective
than the former version. If the argument is seen as an extension of the
more general argument that we saw earlier, it applies here the same gene-
ral reply to it that was shown earlier. If the argument appeals to some spe-
cific valuable relations of love and family relations in the case of humans,
there is still the danger that it imposes on everybody a specific conception
of metaphysical background of value, however traditional and embraced by
the majority it may be.
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A different version of the argument states that cloning attempts to repro-
duce what happens in nature, but the price is that of ignoring what consti-
tutes a human being beyond her biological nature, and the reduction of her
to the reproductive features of less biologically developed beings. This may
appear as an appeal to a common value, and not to a specific moral view,
because it tries to relate to a common sense of dignity we have as humans,
according to which we must always maintain our behaviour at a level that is
superior compared to that of other living kinds. A way back to the repro-
ductive forms of the less developed beings would be a heavy departure
from this rule. Now, it is true that cloning has some resemblance with the
reproduction of the less developed biological organisms that reproduce in
an asexual way, in virtue of the fact that cloning may be based on the bio-
logical source of only one individual. Again, we do not have to deal with an
unproblematic moral intuition, and it is not self-evident what is the moral
consequence of the empirical evidence. Contrary to the statement seen
earlier that appeals to a violation of human dignity, one may state a diffe-
rent position.
Imagine someone who endorses a theory according to which the basis of
morality is represented by a set of natural emotions of approval, i.e. a ver-
sion of emotivist metaethics. The origin of these emotions is explained in
the context of a sociobiological framework that describes our moral atti-
tudes as natural emotions selected by natural evolution. This kind of moral
philosopher may see the attitude to cloning as an emotional response to
one natural instinct in perfect accordance with the logic of nature, there-
fore as a paradigmatic case of moral attitude that fits perfectly with her
metaethics. Of course, she has to show a more sophisticated explanation at
the metaethical level than the brief sketch that I have illustrated, and she
needs some further explanation at the level of the empirical data, too. Spe-
cifically, the explanation she needs has to indicate that there is a sense in
which it might be possible that cloning is a return to a more natural way of
reproduction. The possibility of this hypothesis is derived from a sugges-
tion of Richard Dawkins who says that
»… there is a sense in which, to an evolutionary biologist, cloning is more natural than the
sexual alternative. […] The selfish gene theorem, which treats an animal as a machine pro-
grammed to maximize the survival of copies of its genes, has become a favoured way of ex-
pressing modern Darwinism. […] From this point of view, at least when naïvely interpreted,
sex is paradoxical because a mutant female who spontaneously switched to clonal reproduc-
tion would immediately be twice as successful as her sexual rivals. She would produce female
offspring, each of whom would bear all her genes, not just half of them.«15
A moral philosopher of the kind I indicate, who takes into serious consi-
deration the suggestion of Dawkins about the paradox of sex from the per-
spective of natural evolution, has a basis for a justification of the attitude
to cloning.
However, it is not my ambition, here, to speculate about the messages of
nature, and about what is more and what is less natural, nor about ques-
tions of the foundations of ethics. My only purpose is to show that here we
do not have again to deal with a simple moral intuition, but with a demand-
ing philosophical discussion with deep implications.
The objection that I discuss here may appear also in a different form. In
this case, it says that cloning avoids differentiation, which is a necessary
condition for progress and evolution. Cloning, therefore, would assimilate
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human beings to the less developed forms of life, because it would impede
the progress and evolution of humanity.16
In the answer to the following objection, as well as to the next one, I devia-
te from the strategy I adopt earlier in this section. My arguments until now
had this form. (i) I try to show that the intuitions appealed by the critics of
cloning are problematic. (ii) Further discussion indicates that premises
with deep theoretical implications are required, such that they are heavily
controversial and cannot serve as a crucial basis for a public system of
norms, i.e. obligations and prohibitions. In the following two specific cases,
the arguments are plainly wrong, and I want to show some direct confuta-
tions of them.
There are several reasons to say that differentiation and the possibility of a
further development of human kind may exist, even if cloning is permitted.
First, it is not probable that everybody will require cloning, therefore the
process of differentiation will continue to exist in virtue of those people
that will not apply this reproductive method. Second, it is not probable
that, even if people will massively choose cloning as a reproductive method,
people will massively choose the same models. Diversity will persist as
much as there is actual diversity in taste. Of course, this is not enough to
reply to one aspect of the objection, in the sense that the actually existing
genetic frames will be reproduced, and there will not be new genetic com-
binations. However, diversity between different people will still permit new
forms and frames of social and cultural variety. Third, even if parents will
massively require the reproduction of the same genetic frame, because of
the fact that the strong thesis of genetic determinism is not true, cloning
will not eliminate differences totally.17 And, finally, if the practice degene-
rates, it is still possible to forbid it later, in virtue of clear evidence, and not
in virtue of a mere distant hypothesis, as in the actual formulation.18 It is
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important, here, to remember the presumption of the value of autonomy.
A behavior may be legitimately forbidden only if there is a valid reason to
do this. If something is only potentially, but not probably, dangerous, and
the danger is remote, and it is possible to avoid it when it becomes closer
and more probable, it is better to wait that it becomes closer and more
probable. In this way, we may be sure that we are not suppressing a mani-
festation of the right to autonomy of the individuals.19
The part of the argument that says that cloning ignores what constitutes a
human being beyond her biological nature, is completely without founda-
tion. As far as I understand it, the statement can mean three different
things. The first meaning is that cloning reduces as a matter of fact human
beings to their biological nature only. Interpreted in this way, the state-
ment is clearly wrong. If genetic determinism is false, human beings will
not be reduced to their biological nature by cloning only. There will always
be much of environment, education, personal biography in the personality
of a human being.
In the second meaning, the statement may indicate a cognitive failure: clon-
ing reveals the mistake made in assuming the thesis of genetic determinism.
However, it is not probable that critics appeal to such a cognitive objection,
because their target is primarily directed to the practice of cloning and its
possible consequence. Here we arrive at the third interpretation, i.e. that
cloning is an attempt to reduce human beings to their biological nature.
But this attempt is not particularly dangerous as a source of harm, because,
if the strong thesis of genetic determinism is wrong, it will surely fail. As
Gerard Elfstrom says, it is unusual to forbid an action just because it has
the wrong motivations behind it. Imagine an individual who thinks that by
scratching her right ear with the left hand, she will cause the destruction of
the universe. We can surely judge this person as evil, but we will not forbid
her to scratch her right ear by the left hand.20
4.2. Arguments on cloning as an intrinsic
cause of harm to human beings
I come now to the second sort of arguments against cloning. As I indicated
earlier, it is stated that cloning strengthens the idea that some people can
have a total control of other people’s life by programming their biological
identity. Apart from the assumption of the wrong thesis of the strong ver-
sion of genetic determinism, this argument can take two forms, but in both
of them it leads to wrong moral conclusions. First, it is possible to say that
cloning strengthens this idea independently of whether genetic control of
someone’s life is enough to establish the total control of her personality.
There might be something in the illusion that cloning suggests that tends to
increase the ambition of having a total control of other people’s life. In its
second version, the argument says that cloning can augment the ambition
to control other people’s life, because it gives a further basis for this atti-
tude by giving it additional instruments. Here it is assumed a plausible
weak thesis of genetic determinism.
The argument, in both versions, is at least dubious. It wants to suggest that,
in order to strengthen the idea that people can have a total control of other
people’s life, it is enough to have the illusion of strong genetic determinism
(and, therefore, of the efficiency of cloning), or the awareness of only a
partial effectiveness of cloning. In my opinion, if the strong thesis of ge-
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netic determinism is not true, then the possible additional motivation of
controlling other people’s life by cloning is heavily reduced, and will finally
disappear or will become rare. It is probable that the empirical evidence of
the fact that cloning does not assure that the future person will be able to
reproduce the features that are expected will create a motivation contrary
to the application of cloning to people with such a desire. As is shown by
Elfstrom on Einstein’s example, there is a multiplicity of elements needed
to reproduce a person. There is no reasonable expectation that a new Ein-
stein might be created.21 As a conclusion, after this appears clear to large
parts of population, it becomes not understandable why people might enter
in the complicated procedure of cloning without any reasonable expecta-
tion of success, and it is also not plausible that the illusion of strong genetic
determinism will survive.
There is one more important aspect in the answer to the objection pre-
sently under discussion. The central point of the argument is that the clone
will be under the pressure of the expectation that she reproduces the origi-
nal individual. That pressure may really appear. The fact that some people
wrongly think that they have applied a procedure that permits a new indi-
vidual to repeat all the expected features of an individual previously exist-
ing, might cause them to make some pressure on the new individual who
might suffer for this, as well as for the frustration for her inability to re-
spond to the expectations. However, among some parents, the attitude of
determining the future of young people already exists and it is related to
the power to direct the structure of life of their children by education. This
seems to me to indicate that the possibility of cloning is not primarily a
source of a new motivation, but only a technological instrument that may
be evaluated by people dependently of the motivations they already have.
In other words, cloning can appear as a good opportunity primarily to par-
ents that have an independent motivation to trace the structure of the life
for their children even now, when education seems to be the major instru-
ment for this. If this is so, than the real problem is not cloning as such, but
that of creating an environment in which there is a positive attitude toward
creativity and spirit of innovation among young members of society. If this
social policy fails, and we are concerned about the possible frustrations of
children of ambitious parents, it might be even better that parents can
make use of the additional opportunity to enhance the genetic features of
their children, than only that of influencing them by education. In this case,
children may have greater opportunities to be successful and, therefore,
not to be frustrated.22
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There are now two arguments that I analyse together. They say that the
dignity of the new person is damaged because she is only a ‘copy’ of another
being, and that the identity of the new person is threatened because of the
virtual or real presence of another her. Here we have, at the background of the
objection, the wrong premise of the strong thesis of genetic determinism. It
would be enough to indicate that this premise is wrong to confute the argu-
ment. Here we have strong direct empirical evidence against the argument.
There are frequent examples of human beings with identical genetic codes,
I refer to cases of twins, and these cases speak in favor of the statement
that genetic identity is not sufficient to imply a loss of individuality, or a ra-
tional sense of loss of uniqueness.23 Moreover, in the case of twins there
are even more reasons that can appear as possibilities to threaten the indi-
viduality and uniqueness of the subject, rendering her more similar to an-
other subject. Twins share the pregnancy, which imply that they share some
facts that are relevant in the early development of a being and they can
share a common natural and social environment, as well as a common edu-
cation. All these are factors that will surely render the clone quite different
from the donor. A clone
»… and her nuclear mother differ in three ways in which identical twins are typically the
same. They develop from eggs with different cytoplasmic constitutions, they are not carried to
term in a common uterine environment, and their environments after birth are likely to be
quite different.«24
The third line of argumentation appeals to a right to ignorance. Let’s re-
member that Jonas says that cloning is a threat for this right even if genetic
determinism is not true, because, in his opinion, the mere fact that an indi-
vidual, and her environment, believes that the future is determined breaks
the spontaneity in the creation of a human life. Here again the real prob-
lem is not cloning, but social prejudices and people’s ignorance. There are
different ways to menace the right of an individual from the perspective of
prejudices about the determination of her future: there are racist preju-
dices related to determinism, sexist prejudices, nationalistic prejudices,
prejudices related to the life story of the parents of the individual, etc.
Cloning, therefore, does not create a new social phenomenon. Does it con-
tribute to increase it? Perhaps yes, in the sense that it is possible that peo-
ple that have none of the prejudices indicated earlier can have prejudices
related to cloning and genetic determinism, or they can add this new ele-
ment to their list of prejudices. However, in none of the cases indicated
earlier, prejudices by themselves are a sufficient ground to forbid repro-
duction. The fact that some people believe that members of a race, of a na-
tion, of a gender, of a family are determined to a particular fate, or from
the fact that this belief can be transmitted to new members of society be-
longing to the indicated group, are not sufficient grounds to forbid to re-
produce and to create new members of this race, nation, gender, or family.
By the rule of universalizability, as a basic rule of moral reasoning, we have
to conclude that these same facts, based on prejudice and ignorance, can
not be a ground to forbid cloning. If there are no other grounds to forbid
cloning, than cloning must be understood as something legitimate, there-
fore as an instance of a right. In this case, the correct attitude is to oppose
prejudices and ignorance, not cloning.25
It is important to see, as Tooley does, what are the possible sources of the
limitation of spontaneity from the standpoint of the individual involved.
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Genetic predispositions are a limit to a person’s possible achievements. A
person (Clarissa) can see that an individual with the same genetic predis-
positions as those that she has (Laura), has failed in the attempt to be a fa-
mous singer, although she has tried with all her resources to be successful.
This failure can break the spontaneous attempt of Clarissa to become a fa-
mous singer. However, as Tooley says, there does not seem to be anything
clearly wrong in this. Perhaps, it is better that Clarissa dedicates her life to
some activity where she has greater chances to be successful. On the other
hand, Clarissa can see Laura’s life and think that the only possible future
open to her is identical to Laura’s life. This, however, is a plainly wrong be-
lief, and cannot ground any normative conclusion.26
There remains the objection that says that by cloning the woman is radi-
cally humiliated and reduced to a mere technical reproductive function.
The central point of this objection is indicated by Andrea Dworkin’s words:
»In a world in which cloning works, only compliant women will live. Cloning is the absolute
power over reproduction that men have wanted and have destroyed generations upon genera-
tions of women to approximate. This, of course, is not the logical social consequence. The
technology used to make the cloned sheep is perfectly adequate to induce parthenogenesis
such that women could, if we choose, reproduce ourselves – and eventually this would be an
all-female world. […] Men […] would just die over time. But they won’t, will they? If they did
not already have the real power over reproductive technologies, they would take it – using the
violence that we will not use. But they do have it, don’t they? They have it and they will use it.
Women with attitudes will die or be killed or exiled or marginalized to eventual death. […]
Within reach is a world with fewer but better women.«27
This argument is not plausible for at least two reasons. First of all, there is
nothing in cloning that seems to indicate that it is a typical men’s expres-
sion, instead of women’s expression. As Andrea Dworkin’s example sug-
gests, it can be used by women, too, in order to satisfy some of their emo-
tional needs. Andrea Dworkin herself speaks of the possibility for her to
clone her beloved cat. In an interesting fictitious story, Martha Nussbaum
speaks about the possible intention of a woman to clone her dead lover (or
husband).28 It is heavily unreal to say that in the contemporary world, at
least in the Western world, only men might have the possibility to realize
their intentions, and not women. At least some women have more power
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and financial possibilities than some men, and surely it would be easier for
the former to obtain some result from cloning, than for the latter, although
I do not want to ignore the forms of discrimination to which women are
subjected in some parts of population.
A possible way in which cloning might be used to extend the discrimination
against women is to increase the distance between the vision of women
that are related to men’s sexual satisfaction, and women that are related to
men’s reproductive wishes. The reason to say this is that men might use
women for reproduction without having any sexual relation with them, and
that these women will be transformed in mere machines for reproduction.
At the same time, women that are used for mere sexual pleasure will be re-
duced to this function only. However, the hypothesis that, by this, cloning
will increase discrimination (or discriminations) is distant from being very
plausible. A woman that is objectified is not more happy for the fact that
she is objectified twice (for sexual desire and for reproduction) and not
only once (for sexual desire or for reproduction). In any case, she is de-
prived of the possible pleasure of the activity in which she is engaged.
Moreover, assisted procreation can separate the sexual act and reproduc-
tion, too. There is no known reliable indication that it has increased the
objectification of women. Discrimination against women is a social prob-
lem, but it has to be faced by an adequate social policy, not by an opposi-
tion to technical resources that are by themselves neutral (and are not neu-
tral only in particular social conditions).
4.3. Arguments on cloning as missing legitimate motivations
I come now to the third line of argumentation. According to it, there is
nothing wrong in cloning as such, but it is difficult to see a legitimate moti-
vation in somebody who decides to attempt an application of cloning. The
absence of a legitimate motivation indicates that cloning may only be a
source of abuses, and in no way a procedure, which will be in practice res-
pectful of the rights of the new individual. My answer will be rather brief.
First of all, I see at least two legitimate motivations for cloning. Imagine a
case where the possible father is not fertile because of the level of quality
of his spermatozoids. In this case, the only possibility for the couple to have
a child is to realize heteronymous assisted procreation. However, in this
case the child will have a biological relation with the legal mother only, and
with one person external to the family. This does not represent a problem
for some families. But, this might be felt as a problem for other families. In
the case of cloning of the father, there will be participation of both parents
in the biological relation with the child: the father will give the genetic ma-
terial for the reproduction, the mother will have the relation established in
the process of gestation, as well as the related emotional relation. This
might appear as a better solution for some families. I do not see any moti-
vation that can be classified as morally wrong in this case.29
It is important to stress the difference between my argument and an appar-
ently similar, but in fact different, argument. Gregory Pence gives an argu-
ment for cloning that appeals to considerations similar to those that I offer.
He appeals to the relevance of genetic link for parenthood, and he says
that a valid way to strengthen the parental relation is that the child is a
clone of the father, because in this case the child has the strongest possible
genetic link with the father, while he would have an important link with the
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mother as well, due to pregnancy.30 There is an important difference be-
tween Pence’s proposal and the one that I offer. Pence adopts some ge-
neral presumptions about parenthood – men’s approach to it, and women’s
approach to it. When the question is put in these general terms, with some
additional presumptions that I do not endorse, it seems to me heavily prob-
lematic, and I agree with criticisms expressed in relation to Pence’s pro-
posal.31 I only want to say that the solution that I indicate may be a good
solution for some families, and that there would not be anything wrong in
their choice.
The second possible motivation is suggested by the appearance of a sect of
people who find a particular religious relevance in cloning. I refer to the
Raelian community, although I do not want to connect my argument with
this particular sect, in the sense that, if there are particularly worrying as-
pects of this sect apart from the value they attribute to cloning, we can
imagine in principle, as a thought experiment, a possible religious group
without these sorts of features but that attributes a high relevance to clon-
ing. The freedom in matter of choice of religion is one of the most firmly
declared rights in every free society that is respectful of rights. I do not see
any possible reason to declare as protected all the actually existing religi-
ons, and to close at the same time the door to possible new religions. Obvi-
ously, there will be people who deny the legitimacy of some new religions
by labeling them as mere superstitions. However, which is the ground for
saying that some religions are mere superstitions, while we accept as a ba-
sic human right that of following what gets authority from believing in enti-
ties whose existence can never be publicly proved, at least not by usual
means of public proof, as, for example, those recognized in science or
trials? The only acceptable reason to forbid the practice of a religion is its
opposition to the respect of human rights, or harms to people that it origi-
nates. But, there is no a priori reason to think that members of a religion
will injure people just because of the mere fact that it gives relevance to the
practice of cloning. As an element of particular relevance in judging clon-
ing, it may happily be that members of this religion will take in great con-
sideration the care they owe to their children.
My aim in this part of the paper is not to show specifically two possible le-
gitimate reasons to permit cloning. I want to show just that there are possi-
ble legitimate reasons to apply cloning. Other cases that I do not consider
here may be legitimate, too. However, when cloning is required, when it
might possibly become a safe procedure, its permission must be evaluated
specifically in each singular case, just as this would be a good practice for
assisted procreation in general. Here, it might be possible to state an objec-
tion that says that my proposal is too restrictive and discriminatory: why
are people permitted to reproduce without any specific authorization by
sexual reproduction, while they have to get permission if they require as-
sisted procreation, including cloning? This is a statement endorsed by
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Eugenio Lecaldano, who says that there is no reason to require to other
forms of procreation what is not required to people that procreate by a sex-
ual act.32 In my opinion, it would have some positive aspects to check possi-
ble parents in general, in order to increase the possibility that new children
will be born in their best interest, in an appropriate condition. However, to
enforce this requirement by putting restrictions on sexual procreation
would be too socially invasive, and the benefits that might come from such
a social policy would be smaller than the harms. It is, on the other hand,
easier and less invasive to apply some policies of control when people re-
quire medical help to reproduce. The reason for the distinction is, there-
fore, not discriminatory, but relies on conditions of applicability.
If cloning may be legitimate in some cases, there is no reason to forbid re-
search that will create the possibility to have it as a well functioning prac-
tice (except for the moral question of the permissibility of making experi-
ments on embryos, which I do not consider in this paper). The right way to
approach the problem is to discuss how to create a social situation where
this practice will increase benefits, or at least where it will be possible to
avoid (or reduce) possible harms that might come from this practice while
respecting the rights of people that require cloning on legitimate grounds.
In particular, the problem is to respect the best interests of people that
might be born after cloning was applied in their case. These people are not
condemned to a sad future, to a disadvantaged life, because, as I have tried
to show, there may be legitimate requirements for cloning, but a social
condition must be created so that the possibility of abuses or harms for the
future persons is rigorously reduced.33
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Elvio Baccarini
Einige gemeinsame Fragen in der moralischen
Klonierungsdebatte aus liberaler Sicht
Auf die bloße Ankündigung der Möglichkeit menschlichen Klonens formulierten die Moralisten
kritische Argumente gegen die Zulässigkeit der Einführung dieser Praxis. Ein kritischer Blick auf
diese Argumente zeigt jedoch, dass sie nicht wohl fundiert sind, d.h. dass sie nicht als legitime Ar-
gumente in der Debatte um das in einem Staat öffentlich zulässige zu verwenden sind, denn sie
stützen sich auf falsche Prämissen oder sie sind unvereinbar mit Erlaubnissen im Hinblick auf an-
dere Formen der menschlichen Reproduktion.
Jedes Argument zugunsten des Verbotes menschlichen Klonens wird mindestens anhand eines der
folgenden Mittel analysiert: Steht es im Einklang mit den Grundprinzipien zeitgenössischer De-
mokratien (insbesondere im Hinblick auf das Recht jedes Individuums, dem eigenen Wertesystem
in seinem eigenen Leben zu folgen); stützt es sich auf wohl fundierte und weitgehend akzeptierte
Ergebnisse wissenschaftlicher Forschungen; ist es kohärent mit den üblichen und allgemein an-
erkannten moralischen Vorstellungen, die mit anderen Formen menschlicher Reproduktion ver-
bunden sind. Das Hauptargument, das als gute Grundlage zum Verbot menschlichen Klonens
angesehen wird, ist die moralische Pflicht, künftigen Personen keinen Schaden zuzufügen.
Das Ergebnis des Verwerfens traditioneller moralischer Argumente gegen das menschliche Klonen
bedeutet keine allgemeine Rechtfertigung menschlichen Klonens, es zeigt nur, dass neue oder
präziser ausgeklügelte Argumente zu erbringen sind, wenn menschliches Klonen verboten werden
soll.
Elvio Baccarini
Une vue libérale sur quelques questions courantes dans
le débat éthique autour du clonage
Dès la simple annonce de la possibilité de cloner des humains, les moralistes ont formulé des ar-
guments contre l’introduction d’une telle pratique, la jugeant inadmissible. Or, un examen critique
de ces arguments montre qu’il ne sont pas bien fondés, c’est-à-dire que, souvent, ils ne sont pas
propres à être mis en avant en tant qu’arguments légitimes dans les débats sur ce qui est publique-
ment admissible, qu’ils reposent sur des prémisses erronées, ou qu’ils ne sont pas cohérents avec
l’admissibilité d’autres formes de reproduction humaine. Chacun des arguments en faveur de la
proscription du clonage humain est analysé ici sous au moins l’un des aspects suivants: est-il en
conformité avec les principes fondamentaux des démocraties modernes (notamment en ce qui
concerne le droit de chaque individu de suivre dans sa vie ses propres valeurs), est-il fondé sur les
résultats incontestés et communément admis des recherches scientifiques, enfin, est-il cohérent
avec l’attitude générale à l’égard d’autres formes de reproduction humaine. L’argument massue en
faveur de la proscription du clonage humain est celui qui met en avant le devoir moral qui con-
siste à ne pas faire de tort à la future personne.
Le résultat de cette réfutation des arguments éthiques traditionnels contre le clonage humain ne
représentent pour autant pas une justification complète de ce dernier: elle montre tout simplement
qu’il faudra trouver des arguments plus concluants si l’on veut faire interdire le clonage humain.
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